















In the shadow of the recent crises such as Eurozone crisis, Brexit, mass migration flaw, 
the rule of law concerns in some Member States, the debate about the future of the 
European integration has restarted both within politics and political science as well.  
Several EU-level, regional and national initiatives were born in the last few years.  
The paper aims to overview the most important initiatives and plans were made at 
different level and by different actors, find the common elements and the most dividing 
issues of them via discourse analysation. At the same time not only the so called top-down 
initiatives are in the focus of the research, but it plans to map the public opinion about the 
possible future of the integration through the analysation of the relevant recent polls.  
Since most of the initiatives emphasize the necessity of unity of the integration but at 
the same time Member States are divided on certain policies, this unity can be achieved 
only via differentiated integration. Comparing to the previous waves of such a debate, we 
can witness that the main issue is not deepening and/or widening of the integration now, 
but deepening and differentiation. 
 
 
I. EU-level discussions and plans 
 
In the Bratislava Declaration and Roadmap adopted on 16 September 2016 the leaders of 
the 27 Member States admitted that it was a critical time for the European project since 
one Member State had decided to leave the EU previously, and decided to start a broad 
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discussion about the future of the integration resulting an attractive vision of the EU.1 
They identified priority areas such as migration and external borders, internal and external 
security, economic and social development, youth, where concrete steps have to be taken 
in order to tackle the multi-dimensional crises of the European integration.2 The 
importance of the Bratislava Declaration and Roadmap is that these documents started the 
EU-level discussion on the future of the integration and initiated concrete measures on 
certain policy areas with the intention to follow-up the process. 
The European Commission’s White Paper on the Future of Europe adopted on 1st 
March 2017 outlined five, at least theoretically, possible scenarios regarding the future of 
the European integration with the aim to provoke thinking about the issue. As the 
document stresses: “The starting point for each scenario is that the 27 Member States 
move forward together as a Union”.3The five options cover a wide range of, sometimes 
overlapping, possibilities of the European integration as it is detailed below. 
1.  Carrying on: basically this scenario would preserve the status quo, so  EU focuses 
on implementing and upgrading its current reform agenda on several policy area 
e.g. asylum and migration, economic and monetary union, single market. Priorities 
are regularly updated and problems are tackled as they arise.4 As Matej Avbelj 
stresses, in this scenario any further development of the integration depends on the 
political willingness of all Member States.5 
2.  Nothing but the single market: in this case the EU 27 cannot agree to do more in 
many policy areas (monetary and fiscal issues, migration, security and defence), 
consequently the EU is gradually re-centred on the strengthening of the single 
market. Cooperation on new issues of common concern is often managed bilaterally 
on a case by case basis. Significant level of deregulation is expected on European 
level being coupled with easier and faster decision-making. On the other hand in 
this scenario citizens’ rights derived from EU law may become restricted over 
time.6 
3.  Those who want more do more: the Commission’s document doesn’t use the 
expressions of flexible integration such as multi-speed or multi-tier Europe, 
enhanced cooperation or the concept of concentric circle, but this scenario 
basically covers this option. The policy areas where the “coalition of the willing” 
might be formed are defence, internal security, taxation or social matters. In this 
                                                          
1  EUROPEAN COUNCIL: The Bratislava Declaration and Roadmap Bratislava, 16 September 2016 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21250/160916-bratislava-declaration-and-roadmapen16.pdf (2019. 
03. 24.) 1. 
2  EUROPEAN COUNCIL 2016, 3-5. 
3  EUROPEAN COMMISSION: White Paper on the Future of Europe 2017 Reflections and scenarios for the 
EU27 by 2025 COM(2017)2025 of 1 March 2017 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/ 
white_paper_on_the_future_of_europe_en.pdf (2019.03.25.) 15. 
4  EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2017, 16. 
5  AVBELJ, MATEJ: What Future for the European Union? Berlin Social Science Center Discussion Paper SP 
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6  EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2017, 18.  
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option different clubs of the Member States appear and citizens’ rights derived 
from EU law may start to vary depending on whether or not they live in a country 
that has chosen to do more.7 Disadvantages of this option are the decrease of 
transparency of the decision-making and the possibility of formation of a second 
class EU-membership, while the main advantage is that this scenario reflects to the 
existing significant differences among the Member States’ vision on the future of 
the integration. 
4.  Doing less more efficiently: the EU focuses on delivering more and faster in 
selected policy areas where there is a consensus among the Member States such as 
innovation, trade, security and defence, or border management, while doing less 
elsewhere such as regional development, social policy, public health, and 
consumer protection.8  
5. Doing much more together: means basically the implementation of the formation 
of an ever closer union envisaged in the Article 1 of the Treaty on the European 
Union.9 In this scenario the Member States admit and accept that they are not well-
equipped enough to face the current challenges on their own, so they decide to 
share more power and competencies on the European level. While this option gives 
the opportunity for faster decision-making and implementation and more right for 
the citizens derived from EU law, it didn’t reflect to the problem of the lack of 
legitimacy and the democratic deficit of the EU.10 
 
On the basis of the white paper series of reflection papers covering key topics for the 
future of the European Union (such as social dimension, harnessing globalisation, 
deepening the economic and monetary union, defence policy, the future of EU finances, 
and sustainable development) have been published subsequently by the European 
Commission evaluating the scenarios available for the specific policy areas.11 
In the Rome Declaration which was made on the 60th anniversary of the signature of 
the Treaty of Rome 25th March 2017, leaders of the 27 Member States and the president of 
the European Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission decided to 
make the European Union stronger and more resilient, through even greater unity and 
solidarity amongst them and the respect of common rules. They declared:  
“We will make the European Union stronger and more resilient, through even greater 
unity and solidarity amongst us and the respect of common rules. Unity is both a necessity 
and our free choice.  […] We will act together, at different paces and intensity where 
necessary, while moving in the same direction, as we have done in the past, in line with 
the Treaties and keeping the door open to those who want to join later. In the ten years to 
come we want a Union that is safe and secure, prosperous, competitive, sustainable and 
                                                          
7  EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2017, 20. 
8  EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2017, 22. 
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Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen.” 
10  EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2017, 24. 
11  More details available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/future-europe/white-paper-future-europe-and-
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socially responsible, and with the will and capacity of playing a key role in the world and 
of shaping globalisation.” 
The Declaration follows the multi-speed Europe concept: moving into the same 
direction, but at different paces and intensity where necessary. It’s important to note that 
there is no explicit reflection to the Commission’s White Paper and its five scenarios in 
the Rome Declaration, nevertheless priority areas envisaged in the Rome Agenda are 
mostly overlapping with those defined in the Commission’s documents. 
1.  A safe and secure Europe: via secured external borders, efficient, responsible and 
sustainable migration policy, fight against terrorism and organised crime. 
2.  A prosperous and sustainable Europe: via jobs, investments and sustainable 
growth, developed single market, more stable single currency, completion of the 
Economic and Monetary Union, converging economies, clean and safe 
environment and last but not least secured energy. 
3.  A social Europe: through fighting against unemployment, discrimination, social 
exclusion and poverty, preservation of cultural heritage and promoting cultural 
differences. 
4.  A stronger Europe on the global scene: via development of existing and new 
partnerships, promoting stability and prosperity in its immediate neighbourhood to 
the east and south, creating a more competitive and integrated defence industry, 
strengthening the common security and defence policy, promoting free and fair 
trade and a positive global climate policy.12 
 
Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission called for a more united, 
stronger and more democratic Union in his ‘State of the Union’ 2017 speech. In order to 
be more united, EU has to encourage the completion of the Eurozone, the Schengen 
cooperation and the creation of the European Pillar of Social Rights. Towards the stronger 
Union faster decision-making in the field of single market, European Minister for 
Economy and Finance, a European intelligence unit and a fully-fledged European Defence 
Union is needed. Last but not least in favour of a more democratic Union the concept of 
‘Spitzenkandidat’ has to be preserved and the merger of the presidency of the European 
Council and the European Commission is needed.13 
Donald Tusk, President of the European Council proposed the Leader’s Agenda14, a 
new work programme of the European Council for the request of EU leaders at a meeting 
in Tallinn, Estonia on 28 September 2017 and the concept was endorsed by the European 
Council on 20 October 2017. The Leader’s Agenda is on one hand a new format of the 
European Council since it’s an informal meeting of the 27 heads of state and government 
and on the other hand it’s a new working method in which instead of striving to find a 
                                                          
12  EUROPEAN COUNCIL: The Rome Declaration. Declaration of the leaders of 27 member states and of the 
European Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission European Council Statements and 
remarks 25/03/2017 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/25/rome-declaration/ 
(2019.03.25.) 
13  JUNCKER, JEAN-CLOUDE: State of the Union Address 2017 Brussels 13 September 2017 
http://europa.eu/rapid/ press-release_SPEECH-17-3165_en.htm (2019.03.26.) 6-9. p. 
14  See the topics and notes of the Leader’s Agenda: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/tallinn-leaders-
agenda/  
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consensus on a draft conclusion regarding highly sensitive and contentious issues, leaders 
of the Member States first discuss the topic in an open, free-flowing debate and then 
return to it at a future European Council meeting, with the aim to reach agreement. The 
Leader’s Agenda may be perceived as a significant institutional innovation of the 
European Council derives from the future of Europe debate at EU level.15 
The discussion on the future of the EU had an impact on the European Parliament as 
well. First of all the European Parliament adopted several resolutions as a contribution to 
the debate. In its first resolution, right after the Brexit referendum, the Parliament pointed 
out that it was a critical moment for the EU and that the interests and expectations of the 
Union’s citizens must have been brought back to the centre of the debate. It laid down the 
possibility of a multi-speed integration in which „some Member States may choose to 
integrate more slowly or to a lesser extent, but the core of the EU must be reinforced and à 
la carte solutions should be avoided”16. In its second resolution adopted on 16 February 
2017 the Parliament suggested to exploit the unused potential of the Lisbon Treaty (e.g. 
the passerelle clauses). It stressed that the community method was best suited for the 
functioning of the Union and had a number of advantages over the intergovernmental 
method, as it was the only one that allowed for greater transparency, efficiency, qualified 
majority vote in Council, and the equal right of co-legislation by the European Parliament 
and Council. Intergovernmental solutions should only be an instrument of ultima ratio, 
subject to strict conditions17. In its third resolution the Parliament called for the reduction 
of á la carte solutions namely the Member States opt ins and opt outs, but at the same time 
it emphasized the importance of enhanced and structured cooperation proposing less 
restrictive requirements of them ( European Parliament, 2017b: 9.). It also envisaged the 
systematic revision of the Treaties in which the Parliament should make an own proposal 
for Treaty amendment.18 In October 2017 the Parliament set out its overall vision for the 
future of Europe which basically summarized the suggestions of the previously adopted 
resolutions.19  
The European Parliament takes part in the debate on the future of the integration not 
only via setting out its own position, but through providing a democratic and open forum 
for the discussion. President of the European Parliament at that time, Antonio Tajani 
announced that the Parliament would host a series of Future of Europe debates during 
                                                          
15  ANGHEL, Suzana – DINAN, DESMOND – DRACHENBERG, Ralf: From Rome to Sibiu. The European Council and 
the Future of Europe Debate. European Parliamentary Research Service April 2018 http://www.europarl. 
europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/615667/EPRS_STU(2018)615667_EN.pdf (Letöltés ideje: 2019.03.25.) 8. p. 
16  EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: European Parliament resolution of 28 June 2016 on the decision to leave the EU 
resulting from the UK referendum (2016/2800(RSP)) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2016-0294+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN  (2019.03.26.) 1-2. 
17  EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 on improving the functioning of 
the European Union building on the potential of the Lisbon Treaty. (2014/2249(INI)) http://www.europarl. 
europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2017-0049+0+DOC+ PDF+V0//EN 
(2019.03.26.) 7. 
18  EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 on possible evolutions of and 
adjustments to the current institutional set-up of the European Union. (2014/2248(INI)) http://www.europarl. 
europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2017-0048+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN (2019. 
03. 26.) 18. 
19  See: European Parliament: Future of Europe: European Parliament sets out its vision 2017 http://www. 
europarl.europa.eu/resources/library/media/20171023RES86651/20171023RES86651.pdf  
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plenary sessions giving an opportunity to the heads of state and government to express 
their visions on the issue. Up to the time of writing this paper 18 leaders of the Member 
States accepted the invitation and took part in the debate on the future of the EU.20   
Last but not least we have to mention the Commission’s initiative on the protection of 
the Union's budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the 
Member States which aims to address the processes emerged in two Eastern Member 
States, namely in Hungary and Poland. As the document lays out:  
“Respect for the rule of law is important for European citizens, as well as for business 
initiatives, innovation and investment. The European economy flourishes most where the 
legal and institutional framework adheres fully to the common values of the Union. 
[…]Effective respect for the rule of law is a prerequisite for confidence that EU spending 
in Member States is sufficiently protected. [...]The different constitutions and judicial 
systems of the EU Member States are in principle well designed to ensure the rule of law 
and equipped with in-built safeguards to protect citizens against any threat to the rule of 
law. However, a number of recent events have demonstrated generalised weaknesses in 
national checks and balances and have shown how a lack of respect for the rule of law 
can become a matter of serious and common concern within the European Union. The 
result has been a clear request from institutions such as the European Parliament as well 
as from the public at large for the EU to take actions to protect the rule of law.”
21
  
The proposal sets out different measures (depending if the Commission implements 
the Union’s budget in direct, indirect management or in shared management) should be 
taken in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law e.g. a suspension of 
payments or of the implementation of the legal commitment, a prohibition to enter into 
new legal commitments, a suspension of the approval of one or more programmes or an 
amendment thereof, a reduction of pre-financing. The report on the legislative proposal 
was backed by the vast majority of the European Parliament since 397 MEP voted in 
favour, 158 against and 69 abstained. As Petri Sarvamaa, co-rapporteur for the report 
pointed out:  the voting made “a division between those member states where the state of 
the rule of law has already been questioned, and the rest.”22 
 
 
II. Regional23 and national initiatives 
 
Winning the presidential elections in spring 2017 an undoubtedly Europeanist leader, 
Emmanuel Macron got into power in France, who shared his visions and proposals on the 
                                                          
20  EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: Future of Europe debates III Parliament hosts Heads of State or Government. 
Briefing http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/633159/EPRS_BRI(2019)633159_ 
EN.pdf   (2019. 03. 26.) More details available at: http://www.futureofeuropedebates.eu/  
21  EUROPEAN COMMISSION: Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of the Union's budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the 
Member States Brussels. 2.5.2018 COM(2018) 324 final https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/ 
PDF/?uri=CELEX:52018PC0324&from=EN (2019.03.25.) 1. 
22  BAYER, Lili: European Parliament backs plan to link EU funds to rule of law. Politico 1/17/19. 
https://www.politico.eu/article/budget-hungary-poland-rule-of-law-european-parliament-backs-plan-to-
link-eu-funds/ (2019.03.26.) 
23  The expression doesn’t refer to the regions of the EU (NUTS2), but to the groups of certain Member States. 
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future of Europe at Sorbonne University 26 September 2017. In his highly ambitious 
speech, which was generating lots of reflections, he called for a sovereign Europe, 
sovereignty of which consists of the following elements: 
a)  security and defence: launching a common European intervention force, common 
defence budget, shared strategic culture, setting up a European Intelligence 
Academy  and a European Public Prosecutor’s Office for organized crime and 
terrorism; 
b)  control of  our borders and protection of our values: setting up a European Asylum 
Office, a strengthened European Border Police, launching commonly financed 
integration programmes for refugees; 
c)  foreign policy:  consolidated and re-centred foreign policy on the Mediterranean 
and Africa; 
d)  ecological transition: a really working European energy  market, reform of the 
Common Agriculture Policy, setting up a European investigation and inspection 
force for food safety; 
e)  digital technology: becoming the leader digital actor ahead the US and China via 
the creation of digital single market; 
f)  monetary economic power: stabilisation of the Eurozone through setting up a 
separate budget for it which is under the political guidance of a common minister 
for finance and strict control of the European Parliament.24 
 
Macron emphasized the unity of EU as well such as many others before, but unity 
which doesn’t chase uniformity, but unity in diversity. In order to keep unity of the EU we 
have to accept that it cannot operate like the original six-member bloc. Multi-speed EU, 
which is already a reality, could be the solution, especially after the accession of the 
Western Balkan countries which is highly desirable. He stressed the importance of social 
convergence in the EU with the harmonisation of social models of the Member States, the 
revision of the posted workers directive and the setting up of a European Labour 
Authority. The French President emphasized the role of the culture as well, which 
basically the strongest cement that binds the EU together. He initiated to create European 
Universities, a network of universities across Europe with study programmes conducted in 
at least two European languages. The Sorbonne speech contains two important initiatives 
regarding the European institutions as well. On one hand he suggested to decrease the 
number of the members of the European Commission to 15 to strengthen its supranational 
role. In his opinion the major funding countries should give up first their commissioners to 
provide an example. On the other hand he proposed a transnational list of the European 
Parliament on the upcoming 2019 elections recommending that 73 seats which is freeing 
up because of Brexit shouldn’t be shared among the staying Member States but should 
became of the transnational list. Last but not least he suggested holding so called 
democratic conventions on which the elements and roadmap of the EU reform could be 
                                                          
24  MACRON, Emmanuel: Speech on New Initiative for Europe. 26 September 2017.https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-
macron/2017/09/26/president-macron-gives-speech-on-new-initiative-for-europe.en (2019. 03. 27.) 
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shared and discussed on an open, transparent and free forum involving Europeans to the 
reform process actively.25  
Macron’s plan about the future of the integration, especially on the risk-sharing reform 
of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) wasn’t to everyone’s liking. German 
minister for finance, Wolfgang Schäuble summarized his country’s view, characterized 
rather as risk-reduction approach, on the issue in a non-paper was circulated to his 
Eurozone colleagues in October 2017. He admitted that the improving short-, medium- 
and long term governance of the EMU is indispensable in line with three principles: 
a) fiscal responsibilities and control should be kept together: instead of transferring 
parts of national sovereignty and control of fiscal rules to the EU level via the 
creation of a Euro Finance Minister, an intergovernmental solution has a reality  
since there is a little willingness from the side of the Member States to change the 
treaties. The already existing European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is the 
appropriate measures for this intergovernmental solution. 
b) better instruments to foster the implementation of structural reforms: structural 
reforms are necessary to modernize economies and to catch up with the rest of the 
Eurozone. Mutualizing existing or future challenges instead of tackling them 
would end up in a weakened currency union as a whole.  
c) credible stabilisation functions to tackle domestic and global crises: national 
automatic stabilizers should be used to absorb shocks. According to Schäuble debt 
mutualisation would create wrong incentives, raises fundamental legal issues and 
would therefore put the stability of the whole Euro area at risk.26 
 
Later, the French and German visions on the Eurozone reform were harmonised by 
June 2018 in the French-German Roadmap for the Euro Area. The document sets out: 
a) there is a need to change the intergovernmental Treaty of the ESM in order to 
include a common backstop instrument. ESM should have the capacity to assess 
the overall economic situation in the Member States, contributing to crisis 
prevention; 
b) the proposal of establishing a Eurozone budget within the framework of the 
European Union to promote competitiveness, convergence and stabilization in the 
euro area, starting in 2021. Resources would come from both national 
contributions, allocation of tax revenues and European resources; 
c) Financial Transaction Tax would be a suitable instrument for the supplementary 
taxation of the financial sector; 
d) all of the Eurozone member states should have functioning unemployment 
protection schemes, a social safety net and appropriate minimum wages. Minimum 
standards for unemployment protection should be accomplished within the 
Eurozone. In a severe economic crisis the national systems could be supplemented 
by the European Unemployment Stabilization Fund. The fund could lend money to 
                                                          
25  MACRON 2017. 
26  SCHÄUBLE, Wolfgang: Non-paper for paving the way towards a Stability Union 2017 
http://media2.corriere.it/corriere/pdf/2017/non-paper.pdf (2019.03.28.)  
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a national social-security system, and once the economic crisis is over, the country 
would be obliged to pay back the funds it borrowed.27 
 
The New Hanseatic League28 which was launched in February 2018 by the financial 
ministers of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands and 
Sweden provided a position paper in March 2018, in which they laid down their common 
view on the strengthening of the EMU, which is different at several points from Macron’s 
proposals. 
a) strengthening the EMU requires first and foremost decisive actions at the national 
level; 
b) initiatives that have public support in Member States should be preferred; 
c) ESM should be strengthened and possibly developed into a European Monetary 
Fund, which should have greater responsibility for the development and 
monitoring of financial assistance programmes, but at the same time decision 
making should remain firmly in the hands of Member States; 
d) the new multiannual financial framework (MFF) should help to foster sustainable 
growth and the implementation of structural reforms whilst respecting the 
responsibility and ownership of Member States for such reforms.29 
 
Visegrad Group, regional cooperation of Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia is involved actively in the debate on the future of the European integration in 
general and on specific policy areas such as asylum and migration as well.  
The Hungarian Presidency Programme (2017/2018) set the idea of a stronger and 
more efficient Europe instead of the idea of more Europe. To reach this goal EU has to 
take into account the opinion of all Member States, has to pay more attention to the voice 
of the European citizens and has to strengthen the role of the Member States within the 
Union. The document emphasises the aim to prevent any further fragmentation of the EU, 
the respect of national and regional diversity (unity in diversity). Respecting the principle 
of subsidiary as well as the strategic leadership of the European Council and strengthening 
the national parliaments are inevitable for the stronger and more efficient Europe.30  
                                                          
27  French-German Roadmap for the Euro Area (2018) https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/PDF/2018/ 
Finances-Euro_Area_Roadmap-EN.pdf  (2019.03.30.)  
28  The main aim of the League to counter balance the Franco-German tandem after the UK leaves the 
European Union. 
29  NEW HANSEATIC LEAGUE: Finance ministers from Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, the 
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In January 2018, still during the Hungarian Presidency, members of the Visegrad 
Group adopted the V4 Statement on the Future of Europe. The document defined six 
elements of the common vision of the Visegrad countries: 
a) save already achieved results: economic and Monetary Union, proper functioning of 
Schengen Cooperation, control over the external borders, protection and further 
development of the Single Market and enlargement should be in the focus of the EU; 
b) unity in diversity: strong Europe means on the one hand the unity of EU, and 
strong member states with respecting their identities, history and culture on the 
other hand. EU Institutions should treat all Member States equally and act strictly 
within the remits of their respective Treaty-based competences; 
c) an inclusive debate on the future steps: based on the Bratislava and Rome 
Declaration EU 27 should be engaged in collective and inclusive considerations on 
the future; 
d) competitiveness: the competitiveness of the Union should be strengthened in 
internal and global terms as well.  Digitalization (European Digital Single Market), 
innovation, development of human resources and reduction of the administrative 
burden on entrepreneurs are the main element of this process; 
e) democratic legitimacy: the inter-institutional balance is the most important basis 
for a well-functioning, democratic and legitimate European project. The European 
Council should maintain the key role in defining the general political directions 
and priorities including the future of Europe. The decisions made by the Heads of 
State and Government must not be disregarded at the lower levels of the decision-
making process. Visegrad 4 disagreed with the establishment of a transnational list. 
Democratic legitimacy of the EU legislative process can be based on and 
strengthened through the democratic control by national parliaments by the 
introduction of the red card system. 
f) comprehensive approach to migration policy: guarantee the protection of external 
borders and the differentiation between genuine asylum seekers and illegal and 
economic migrants should be in the centre of the crisis management. The 
document emphasises: experience has shown that only those solutions that have 
been approved by consensus bring the best results in practice and are able to 
effectively address the crisis. Any overall solution for the crisis must therefore be 
constructed with the objective of not to distribute but to prevent the migratory 
pressure on Europe.31 
                                                          
31  VISEGRAD GROUP: V4 Statement on the Future of the EU. 26.01.2018 http://www.visegradgroup.eu/ 
0calendar/2018/v4-statement-on-the (2019.03.28.) 
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On 29 January 2019, the Southern European Union Countries (heads of state and 
government of Cyprus, France, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Malta, and Spain) made the 
Nicosia Declaration in which  
a) they reaffirmed their commitment to the European project and common values, 
such as the rule of law, freedom, democracy, human rights and solidarity;  
b) they called for the deepening of the Single Market, including the development of a 
digital one; 
c) similar to Macron, the ‘Southern Sevens’ supported the establishment of a European 
Labour Agency, with the aim to enhance  EU rules on fair labour mobility;  
d) they stressed the deepening the EMU, completion of the Banking Union and 
setting up a  full-fledged European Deposit Insurance Scheme to be able to tackle 
economic and financial shocks; 
e) regarding border control and asylum policy they called for shared responsibility 
and solidarity among the Member States,  and  the disembarkation of rescued 
migrants in the Mediterranean should be addressed through permanent solutions in 
the framework of international law. In order to address  the root causes of irregular 
migration EU has to intensify work with all our partners outside the EU, by further 
promoting a comprehensive partnership with Africa; 
f) security and defence is also in the focus of the Southern EU Member States. They 
stressed that EU must become a credible security provider for its citizens, so they 
welcomed the launching of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and 




III. Expectation and view of the European citizens regarding the future of the European 
Union 
 
After the overview of the different EU-level, regional and national plans and concepts on 
the future of EU, it’s worthy to examine how the above-mentioned concepts reflect to the 
expectations and opinion of the European citizens. 
European Parliament’s report on citizens’ views on current and future EU action 
shows, among others, the citizens’ preferences about the perceptions of current EU action, 
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Source: EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 2018:11.33 
 
 
As the data of perception of current EU action show (see 1st chart above), in 2016 
citizens thought that the first five policies on which EU action is the less sufficient are: 
fight against unemployment and terrorism (69-69%), migration and fight against tax fraud 
(66-66%), and the protection of external borders (61%), so three policy areas out of five 
connected to the issue of migration crisis. In 2018 fight against unemployment (59%), 
migration (58%), fight against terrorism and tax fraud (57-57%) as well as environmental 
protection (51 %) were perceived as the less sufficient EU policies by the citizens.  
In 2016 the five most adequate policies were: equal treatment of men and women 
(48%), energy supply and security (45%), health and social security (38 %), the promotion 
of democracy and peace in the world, foreign policy and environmental protection (37-37-
37%) and last but not least industrial policy (36%). It’s important to emphasize neither of 
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the above-mentioned policy areas were perceived as adequate by the absolute majority of 
the respondents. 
An additional interesting question is where the citizens expect more EU action or 
intervention. According to the 2nd chart (see below) in 2016 fight against terrorism (82%), 
fight against unemployment (77%), fight against tax fraud (75%), fight against migration 
(74%) and the protection of external borders (71%) were that policy areas where citizens 
wanted more EU action. In 2018 EU citizens expected more intervention by the EU in the 
field of fight against terrorism (77%), fight against unemployment (76%), environmental 
protection (75%), fight against tax fraud (74%) and the promotion of democracy and 
peace in the world (73%). 
 
Chart 2.  
 




Source: EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 2018,10. 
 
 
Not only specific EU policies, but the general development of the EU were asked too, 
since the issue of one-speed vs. two- or multi-speed EU has been being on the agenda for 
a while (see the 3rd chart below). In 2018 44% of respondents (EU28 average) thought that 
differentiated integration is desirable on certain policy areas, this is 5% less than in 2016. 
It’s worthy to note that there is a wide spread among the respondents of the Member 
States regarding the question. The Netherlands (64%), Germany (63%), Belgium (58%), 
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Lithuania (57%), and Cyprus, Slovenia, Austria (55-55-55%) are the five countries where 
the most citizens think, Member States which want to enhance cooperation in certain 
policies should do it without waiting for others. Respondents in Portugal (17%), United 
Kingdom (26%), Spain and Bulgaria (31-31%), Greece (35%) as well as in Romania 
(37%) prefer the less the idea of two- or multi-speed integration, sometimes much below 
the EU 28 average. Interestingly, Great Britain which decided to leave the EU in June 
2016 and had chosen opt out from several EU policies before (such as EMU, Schengen, or 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights) was one of the countries respondents’ of which 
preferred the less a two-or multi-speed EU. It’s important to emphasize that in most of the 
Member States support of the differentiated integration decreased compering to 2016, 
except for Cyprus, Luxemburg, Malta and Greece. 
 
Chart 3. 




Source: EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 2018, 21. 
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The multi-dimensional crises of the European Union generated an active and inclusive 
thinking and discussion about the future of the integration. Comparing to the previous 
waves of such a debate, we can witness that the main issue is not deepening and/or 
widening of the integration, but deepening and the inclusivity. The latter means if the 27 
Member States should go into the same direction at the same pace or if some countries of 
the EU want, may go ahead and create closer cooperation on certain policy areas making 
the integration (more) differentiated. 
One of the conclusions can be drawn that the idea of differentiated integration 
emerged in most of the visions as a desirable way of achieving the ever closer union 
envisaged in the Article 1 of the Treaty on the European Union. At the same time some 
Member States such as Hungary and the majority of opinion polls’ respondents in a 
significant number of the Member States don’t prefer the concept of a multi-speed EU. 
If we take specific policy areas such as economic and monetary union, single market, 
security and defence, migration and border control, we can conclude that most of the 
initiatives agree that these policies should be enhanced, but issue of the way in which it 
should be implemented (community versus intergovernmental) divides the Member 
States. According to the public opinion polls, European citizens would like more EU 
actions and competences on these most dividing policy areas. 
After the overview of the EU-level initiatives we could see that European Council, the 
Commission and the European Parliament are involved into the discussion actively. At the 
same time since the European Council is the responsible institution for identify the general 
political direction and priorities of the integration we have to pay special attention to its 
conclusions on one hand and to a new form and working method of the European Council 
initiated by Donald Tusk, the Leader’s Agenda.  
Due to the number of the Member States, the diverting views on the future of the 
integration in general and in the case of specific policies, as well as to the fact that 
differentiated integration is already an existing phenomenon within the EU, it’s highly 
likely that the forms of differentiation (opt outs, enhanced cooperation, permanent 
structured cooperation) will be used more frequently in the future, especially that the 
reality of a new treaty or a treaty amendment is really small. Further enlargement of the 
EU (special regards to the countries of Western Balkan) also justifies the concept of a 
multi-speed European integration. 
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Az elmúlt évek válságainak árnyékában – úgy, mint az euro zóna krízise, a Brexit, a 
tömeges bevándorlás problémája, valamint a jogállamisággal és demokráciával kapcsolatos 
aggályok néhány tagállam vonatkozásában – az európai integráció jövőjével kapcsolatos 
viták új lendületet kaptak, mind a politika mind a politikatudomány világában. Számos 
uniós szintű, regionális, valamint nemzeti kezdeményezés látott napvilágot az elmúlt 
néhány évben. 
A tanulmány a különböző kormányzati szinteken és szereplők által megfogalmazott 
Európa-terveket igyekszik áttekinteni, feltárva azok közös, valamint legmegosztóbb elemeit 
a diskurzuselemzés módszerét alkalmazva. Ugyanakkor nem csak az ún. top-down 
kezdeményezések állnak a vizsgálódás fókuszában, hanem az európai integráció jövőjére 
vonatkozó uniós polgári attitűdök feltérképezése is, a releváns közvélemény-kutatási 
adatok elemzésével.  
Tekintettel arra, hogy a legtöbb Európa-terv az integráció egységességét hangsúlyozza, 
ugyanakkor a tagállamok számos politika tekintetében megosztottak, ez az egység csak a 
differenciált integráció útján érhető el, illetve tartható fenn. Ellentétben tehát az EU 
jövőjével kapcsolatos diskurzusok korábbi hullámaihoz, most nem az integráció bővülése 
és /vagy mélyülése a központi kérdés, hanem a mélyülés és a differenciált integráció.  
 
